Fighting corruption when existing corruption-control levels count : what do wealth effects tell us? by Simplice A, Asongu
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Fighting corruption when existing
corruption-control levels count : what do
wealth effects tell us?
Asongu Simplice A
24 February 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36901/
MPRA Paper No. 36901, posted 24 February 2012 15:36 UTC
Fighting corruption when existing corruption-control levels count : what do 
wealth effects tell us?
Simplice A. Asongu
E-mail: asongusimplice@yahoo.com
Tel: 0032 473613172
HEC-Management School, University of Liège.
Rue Louvrex 14, Bldg. N1, B-4000 Liège,  Belgium
1
Fighting corruption when existing corruption-control levels count : what do 
wealth effects tell us?
Abstract
Why  are  some  nations  more  effective  at  battling  corruption  than  others?  Are  there 
different determinants in the fight against corruption across developing nations? How do wealth 
effects  play-out  when  existing  corruption-control  levels  matter  in  the  corruption  battle?  To 
investigate  these concerns we examine the determinants  of corruption-control throughout the 
conditional  distribution  of  the  fight  against  corruption.  The  following  broad  findings  are 
established. (1) Population growth is a(an) tool(impediment) in(to) the fight against corruption in 
Low(Middle)  income  countries.  (2)  Democracy  increases  (decreases)  corruption-control  in 
Middle(Low) income countries. As a policy implication, blanket corruption-control strategies are 
unlikely to succeed equally across countries with  different income-levels and  political wills in 
the fight against corruption. Thus to be effective, corruption policies should be contingent on the 
prevailing levels of corruption-control and income-bracket.
JEL Classification: C10; H10; K10; O10; O55
Keywords:  Corruption; Democracy; Government quality; Quantile regression; Africa
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1. Introduction
There is growing attention in the realization among international development experts 
that  development  requires above all,  governance quality.  Over the past decades,  the issue of 
corruption and the search for strategies to fight  its corrosive effects have grown in importance as 
a topic of public debate and a criterion by which civil society scrutinizes leadership. Advice on 
sound  policies,  well  intentioned  incentives  and  aid  efforts  may  not  achieve  their  desired 
objectives unless they are offered in an environment which stimulates self-sustaining growth and 
development(Jain,2001).  There  is  also growing realization  that  unsustainable  policies  do not 
always emerge from a deficiency of knowledge about what best policies should be. Rather they 
could emanate just as much from decision makers distorting economic policies for their own 
interest(Coolidge  &  Rose-Ackerman,  1997;  Grossman  &  Helpman,  1994;  Krueger  1993a; 
Krueger  1993b).  Corruption  is  seen  by  many  as  one  of  the  principal  impediments  to  the 
development of an efficient government system; since it is acknowledged as a “symptom that  
something has gone wrong in the management of the state”(Rose-Ackeman,1999, p.9).  Even the 
public  acknowledges  at  large  that  corruption  is  the  greatest  obstacle  to  economic 
development(Jain, 2001). There is currently a stream of empirical assessments  on the causes and 
consequences of corruption. Though some consensus is slowly emerging on the determinants of 
corruption across countries, a number of aspects remain unaddressed. There is lack of consensus 
on  the  ability  to  measure  corrupt  activity  and  the  difficulty  of  quantifying  the  impact  of 
institutions on fighting corruption(Billger &  Goel, 2009). The focus of this work is the later 
concern. Today policies in the fight against corruption espoused by national governments and 
international organizations happen to be similar across  countries. Yet the effectiveness of some 
of these strategies remain ambiguous (Billger & Goel, 2009).  
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The  present  work  contributes  to  the  literature  by focusing  on the  distribution  of  the 
dependent variables(i.e. control of corruption). Corruption-control(hence CC) determinants and 
governments’  efficacy  in  combating  corruption  maybe  different  across  countries  such  that 
corrupt  and  ‘clean’  countries  respond  differently  to  factors  that  stimulate  the  fight  against 
corruption. This hypothesis prompts the question of whether there are different determinants of 
combating corruption in high CC countries as compared to least CC ones.  Therefore if existing 
levels of CC affect how various motives for the fight against  corruption come  into play, then 
findings  of  this  paper  could  have  significant  implications  both  for  the  literature  and  policy 
orientation  towards  the  battle  against  corrupt  practices  in  Africa.   It  follows that  instead  of 
emphasizing  on groups of  countries  with common CC measures,  policy could instead  target 
groups of countries with the same CC characteristics(high, low or average).  The remainder of 
the paper is presented as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literature. Data and methodology 
are presented and outlined respectively in Section 3. Empirical analysis is covered in Section 4. 
We conclude with Section 5. 
2. Existing literature
2.1 Theoretical highlights
Borrowing from Jain(2001), corruption requires three preconditions: discretionary power 
related  to  regulations(also  see  Rose-Ackeman,  1978),  economic  rents  linked  to  power  and 
sufficiently marginal punishment(Dong et al.,2012). These are the effects of four main theories 
of corruption. (1) Good and misguided governments establish systems that are very rigid. Venal 
bureaucrats  mould  the  rules.  Corruption  diminishes  red-tape  and  if  anything  improves  the 
allocation  of  resources  (Leff,  1964;  Huntington,  1968).  (2)  Good  and  smart  governments 
establish systems that  are  supposed to be rigid.  Venal  bureaucrats  turn-around the rules and 
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regulations.  Corruption reduces bureaucracy and deteriorates allocation efficiency (Laffont & 
Tirole,  1993).   (3)  Greedy  and  smart  governments  make  rules  that  are  very  lax  and  allow 
bureaucrats more discretion than they should normally enjoy. There is absence of red-tape and 
no need for any corrupt activity. Efficient allocation of resources suffers a great deal (Shleifer & 
Vishny,1993). (4) Good and smart governments establish rules that make  it tempting for the 
bureaucrat to take money and turn-around the rules. A bureaucrat introduces red-tape in a bid to 
bend the rules in a way that protects him/her. Corruption and red-tape move hand in hand. 
According to Billger & Goel (2009), the theoretical basis for corruption studies also draw 
from  the  larger  literature  on  the  determinants  of  criminal  activity,  where  rational 
individuals(bribe-givers,  bribe-takers  …etc)  weigh  the  relative  benefits  and  costs  of 
criminal(corrupt)  acts(Becker,  1968).  Potential  benefits  of  corruption  could  include 
disproportionate favors that monopolist bureaucrats could hand-out(Shleifer & Vishny, 1993) or 
they  may  involve  cutting(accelerating)  bureaucratic  red-tape(Guriev,  2004).  The  differential 
levels of impatience(discount rates) across economic agents induce some to accept/offer bribes 
and determine the size of the bribes. Potential costs of  indulging in corrupt activity include the 
cost of apprehension and punishment. Surviving literature does however allow for the possibility 
that monitoring agencies could themselves be corrupt(Banerjee, 1997).
2.2 Types and levels of corruption: how the stakes involved can influence governance
Based on the context of this paper, it is irrelevant to center the debate on the issue of 
whether corruption is inherently good or bad. It is more useful to cite which types of corruption 
have the most corrosive effect on social/economic stability(development).  Political  leadership 
plays a crucial role in promoting/discouraging(governing) corrupt activities. To effectively shape 
this role, it is imperative to move beyond the subjective and qualitative analyses which describe 
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corruption as a mere moral failing of politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen. Thus it is more 
useful to consider it as a politico-economic phenomenon. 
Corrupt activities are prevalent to some degree in all societies. In recent years however 
political  scientists  have  aggressively  searched  to  understand  the  reason  some  nations  and 
societies are clearly more vulnerable to abusive political and economic opportunism than others. 
In  response  they  have  suggested  a  number  of  typologies  that  indicate  links  between  the 
incidences  of  corruption  and specific  stages  of  political,  economic  and social  developments 
(Kpundeh,1998). With respect to some authors, the types and amounts of corruption vary in 
accordance with a number of factors affecting the relationship between government and civil 
society(Johnston, 1982). For the purpose of explicitly underlining the objective of our study, it is 
useful to categorize the phenomenon into three frameworks: incidental, systematic and systemic 
corruption,  as  summarized  in  Table  1(consistent  with  Kpundeh (1998)).  Firstly,   Incidental 
corruption  is typical of petty bribery and involves opportunistic individuals or small groups. 
Within this framework, corruption is the exception rather than the rule. High-level private sector 
actors and senior officials are seldom disturbed by such theft. Secondly, Systematic corruption is 
organized, not necessarily pervasive or institutionalized  but recurrent. It usually involves large 
gains which are for the most  part  subject  to popular  scandals.  Whereas  it  is entrenched and 
functions  with  large  a  number  of  officials,  intermediaries  and  entrepreneurs,  this  form  of 
corruption  originates  from   high-level  civil  servants  that  recognize  and  exploit  the  illegal 
ventures and opportunities in government departments and agencies. Hence, this practice is the 
direct  violation  of the regulation and rule  of law. Thirdly,  Systemic  corruption is  pervasive, 
institutionalized(perhaps condoned but not necessarily approved), and built into the economic 
and political institutions. It occurs and flourishes in circumstances where public sector wages fall 
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below  a   living  threshold.  In  contrast  to  systematic  corruption,  it  involves  all  levels  of 
employment.
Table 1: A Simplified Typology of Corruption
Type Main Actors Mode
Incidental 
Petty officials, interested 
officials and opportunistic 
individuals. 
Small size embezzlement and misappropriation, 
bribes, favoritism and discrimination. 
Systematic 
Public officials, politicians, 
representatives of donor and 
recipient countries, 
bureaucratic elites, business 
men and middle men.
Bribery and kickbacks, collusion to defraud the 
public, large-scale embezzlement and 
misappropriation through public tender and 
disposal of public property, economic privileges 
accorded to special interests, large political 
donations and bribes. 
Systemic 
Bureaucratic elites, politicians, 
business men and white-collar 
workers. 
Large-scale embezzlement through ‘ghost 
worker’ on government pay roll, embezzling 
government funds through false procurement-
payment for nonexistent goods, large scale 
disbursement of public property to special and 
privileged interest under the pretext of ‘national 
interest’, favoritism and discrimination exercised 
in favor of ruling parties in exchange for political 
contributions. 
Source: Kpundeh(1998)
Therefore from a theoretical standpoint the fight against corruption could be incidental, 
systematic  or  systemic.  However  from a  practical  view,  legislation  against  corruption  often 
encompasses  the  three  types.  Our  paper  focuses  indifferently  on  the  three  categories  of 
corruption.  This  is  because,  where  systemic  corruption  is  present,  systematic  and incidental 
corruption are already prevalent; which is the case of most African countries. 
2.3 Governance and fight against corruption in Africa
A  heated  debate  has  raged  on  for  years  over  Africa’s  economic  woes.  Besides  the 
obvious  problems  of  warfare,  drought  and  disease,  the  usual  suspect  is  economic 
policy(Coolidge  &  Rose-Ackerman,  1997).  Corruption  remains  one  of  the  most  daunting 
challenges for majority of  African countries. As supported by several studies and surveys, it is a 
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major obstacle to economic progress, social welfare, service delivery and good governance in the 
continent. 
Borrowing from the United Nations  Economic  Commission  for  Africa(UNECA,2009, 
p.1),  it  is  estimated  that  in  2004,  the  continent  lost  more  than  $148  billion  to  corruption; 
approximately 25% of its Gross Domestic Product(GDP). More so, the African Development 
Bank(ADB,2006, p.7) suggests that 50% of tax revenue and $30 billion in aid for Africa ends up 
in corrupt hands. With respect to the UNECA(2005), corruption ranked as one of the three most 
serious  national   problems  confronting  African  countries,  the  other  two  being  poverty  and 
unemployment.  According to the 2009 African Governance Report, corruption seems to have 
worsened in many Africa countries (UNECA, 2009). Most governance institutions: executive, 
legislative, judiciary and public service are deemed to be corrupt. In accordance with the report, 
poor governance, lack of accountability and transparency, low level of democratic culture and 
tradition, deficiency in citizen participation, lack of clear regulations, low level of institutional 
control,  extreme poverty  and inequality  could  be  cited  as  major  causes  of  corruption.  Civil 
society is not even immune to the scourge. In addition, a blurred distinction between private and 
public  interests,  inadequate  accounting  and  auditing,  over  regulated  bureaucracy  and 
deterioration of acceptable moral standards are all part of the problem. 
Many African  countries  have  adopted  policy  measures,  enacted  laws  and established 
institutions in attempts to address the issue. Still corruption continues to be a lingering concern 
in governance and economic life. In this paper we attempt to explain determinants in the fight 
against  corruption.  Its  contribution  to  the  literature  is  threefold.  (1)  By  focusing  on  the 
distribution  of  the  dependent  variable,  we  assess  if  corrupt  and  ‘clean’  countries  respond 
differently to factors that deter corrupt activity.  Unlike mainstream literature,  we are able to 
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provide an assessment of CC conditional on the distribution of CC. (2) The use of much recent 
data(2002-2010) based on majority(46) of African countries provides results with  inclusive and 
updated policy implications.  (3) Disaggregation of the data-set into four homogenous panels, 
reflecting   income-levels(low,  middle,  lower-middle  and  upper-middle)  could  provide  more 
targeted policy implications.               
Given  both  the  herculean  task  of  measuring  the  true  level  of  corruption  and  the 
substantial  effort  required  in  creating  another  index(which  could  be  no  better  than  existing 
indices), two research avenues have been proposed(Billger & Goel, 2009).  The first consists of 
examining additional determinants of corruption (Treisman, 2000) whereas  the second entails 
employing different estimation techniques(McAdam & Rummel, 2004). The later strategy is the 
object of this paper. This approach allows us to capture the subtle differences in the determinants 
of CC across ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ countries. Therefore an assessment throughout the conditional 
distribution  of  the  fight  against  corruption  could  substantially  add  to  the  extant  body  of 
knowledge in the corruption development nexus. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data
We  examine  a  panel  of  46  countries  with  updated  data(2002-2010)  from  African 
Development Indicators(ADI) of the World Bank(WB). To allow for more options in policy 
implications,  the  data-set  is  disaggregated  into  income-levels(low,  middle,  lower-middle  and 
upper-middle). The endogenous variable is the ‘control of corruption’ indicator; consistent with 
the corruption literature(Billger &  Goel,2009; Okada & Samreth,2012; Asongu,2012). In this 
paper we use five control variables: level of economic prosperity, population growth, democracy, 
regulation quality and government effectiveness. These variables have been used collectively or 
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separately  in  the  corruption  literature(Bardhan,1997;  Treisman,2000;  Jain,2001;  Aidt,2003; 
Lambdorff,2006; Billger & Goel,2009). A significant bulk of research has shown that a politico-
economic approach stressing the importance of institutions is a powerful tool in understanding 
corruption(Abed  &  Gupta,2002;  Bradhan,1997;  Rose-Ackerman,1997).   Electoral  rules  and 
structures  substantially  influence  the  corruption  level(Kunicova  & Rose-Ackeman,2005)  and 
countries tend to achieve an equilibrium position that is driven by the balance of political forces 
and institutions(Bird et al.,2006; Bird et al.,2008).  Beyond these empirical bases in the choice of 
government-quality control variables, the theoretical underpinnings of the corruption literature 
point to the central role of good-governance  in the fight against the scourge. In plainer terms, 
selection  of  variables  is  fully  justified  by theoretical  and empirical  literature.  Corresponding 
summary statistics(Appendix 1), correlation analysis(Appendix 2), variable definitions(Appendix 
3) and presentation of countries(Appendix 4) are provided in the appendices. 
Apart  from   good-governance  determinants,  borrowing  from  Billger  &  Goel 
(2009,p.300), economic prosperity and democracy are standard determinants of CC. Economic 
prosperity  in  the  literature(Serra,2006)  is  observed  to  decrease  corruption  because  from 
common-sense  to  some  extent  economic  theory  bribe-takers  and  bribe-givers  are  lower  in 
wealthier nations, as the propensity to take bribe decreases when growth in national income is 
equitably distributed. Political competition entrenched in democracy is more likely to exert an 
appealing effect on the fight against corruption  because elected officials are required to account 
for  policies  and are sanctioned by the  electorate  if  election  promises  are  not  kept.  A major 
election promise in majority of  African countries is the fight against corruption. Government 
quality  enshrined  in  regulation  quality,  government  effectiveness,   rule  of  law,  voice  & 
accountability and political stability(no violence) ensure greater economic and political freedoms 
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which  lead  to  less  corruption(Chowdhury,  2004;  Goel  &  Nelson,  2005).  The  size  of  the 
population is also likely to affect corruption, especially if demographic change is accompanied 
with  a  higher  degree  of  urbanization(Billger  &  Goel,  2009).  A greater  concentration  of  the 
population  in  urban  areas  is  likely  to  increase  their  discount  rates  and  provide  greater 
opportunities  for  interactions  between  potential  bribe-takers  and  bribe-givers.  Conversely,  a 
highly concentrated  urban population could indicate  a greater  chance  of informal  corruption 
oversight (Billger & Goel, 2009). 
3.2 Methodology 
Borrowing from  Billger  &  Goel (2009),  to  determine  whether  existing  levels  of  CC 
affect how various determinants in the battle against corruption come into play, we use quantile 
regression.  This  approach  enables  us  to  investigate  if  the  relationship  between  CC and  the 
exogenous  variables  differ  throughout  the  distribution  of  the  dependent  variable(Keonker  & 
Hallock, 2001). 
Previous studies on the determinants of corruption are based on estimation by Ordinary 
Least Squares(OLS), which report parameter estimates at the conditional mean of corruption. 
Whereas mean effects are certainly important, this study expands such findings using quantile 
regression. In addition, one of the underlying assumptions of OLS regression is that the error 
term and the dependent variable are normally distributed. However, quantile regression does not 
require a normally distributed disturbance term. Thus, based on this estimation technique we are 
able  to  carefully  assess  the  determinants  of  CC throughout  the conditional  distribution  with 
particular emphasis on the best and worst fighters of corruption. Quantile regression( hence QR) 
yields parameters estimated at multiple points in the conditional distribution of the dependent 
variable(Koenker & Bassett, 1978) and has been relevant in recent corruption literature(Billger 
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& Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012). The θ th quantile estimator of the endogenous variable 
is obtained by solving for the following optimization problem.
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Where θ ∈ ( 0 ,1). Contrary to OLS that is based on minimizing the sum of squared residuals, 
with QR we minimize the weighted sum of absolute deviations. For example the 10th or 90th 
quantiles(with  θ =0.10  or  0.90  respectively) by  approximately  weighing  the  residuals.  The 
conditional quantile of iy given ix is :
θβθ iiy xxQ ′=)/(                                                                                      (2)
where unique slope parameters are derived for each θ th quantile of interest. This formulation is 
analogous to  βixxyE ′=)/( in the OLS slope though parameters are estimated only at  the 
mean of the conditional distribution of the endogenous variable. For the model in Eq.(2) the 
dependent  variable  iy  is  the  CC indicator  while  ix  contains  a  constant  term,  GDP growth, 
population growth, democracy, regulation quality and  government effectiveness. The quantile 
estimation approach is more robust than the OLS approach in the presence of outliers when the 
distribution of the dependent variable is a highly non-normal pattern(Okada & Samreth, 2012). 
We also report findings for Least Absolute Deviations(LAD) which should correspond to those 
of the 0.5th  quantile  for robustness purpose.  
4. Empirical analysis
4.1 Low and Middle income countries 
The findings presented in Table 2 entail OLS, LAD and QR estimates. While Panel A 
presents results for Low income countries, findings for Middle income countries captured by 
Panel B.  OLS estimates provide a baseline of mean effects and we compare these to estimates of 
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LAD and  separate  quantiles  in  the  conditional  distributions  of  the  endogenous  variable.  In 
interpreting the signs of estimated coefficients,  note should be taken of the fact that smaller 
values(in conditional distributions) of the endogenous  variable denote less  CC. 
The following could be established from the findings. (1) In Panel A,  OLS regressions 
show that while economic prosperity mitigates the control of corruption, population growth and 
good-governance(regulation quality and government  effectiveness) improve it.  Corresponding 
Panel B OLS results differ from those of Panel A in one dimension: population growth decreases 
the fight against corruption. It follows that based on OLS, population growth is a tool for the 
fight  against  corruption  only in  Low income countries.  (2)  Based on QR, in  both Low and 
Middle income countries, economic prosperity reduces incentives to CC with a higher magnitude 
at  higher  quantiles:  countries  that  are  already  taking  the  corruption  fight  seriously.  (3)  As 
concerns QR  estimates on population growth, while for Low income countries(hence LICs) the 
magnitude of the positive effect of population growth on CC increases in tandem with incentives 
to  fight  corruption,  for  Middle  income  countries(hence  MICs),  the  negative  effect  of 
demographic change on CC has no definite pattern(wave-like effect across the distribution). (4) 
Whereas  democracy  diminishes  CC  in  LICs(with  the  effect  only  significant  at  the  0.90th 
quantile), the positive effect of democracy on CC in MICs is consistently significant across the 
conditional  distribution(though  the  magnitude  of  the  effect  is  wave-like).  (5)  Government 
effectiveness  in  either  LICs  or  MICs  improves  CC with  the  magnitude  increasing  with  the 
distribution: that is as the battle against corruption increases. (6) Regulation quality ameliorates 
CC in either LICs or MICs with a quasi-normal distribution with peaks at the 0.50th and 0.25th 
quantiles  for  LICs  and  MICs  respectively.  (7)  The  LAD  findings  correspond to  the  0.50th 
quantile estimates across specifications. 
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Table 2:Corruption-Control: Low and Middle income countries  
Panel A: Low Income Countries(28)
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant -0.647*** -0.198 -0.512*** -0.351*** -0.198* -0.438*** -0.473***
(0.000) (0.281) (0.000) (0.000) (0.060) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity -0.007* -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.009
(0.073) (0.469) (0.386) (0.214) (0.369) (0.149) (0.237)
Population growth 0.100*** -0.048 -0.091*** -0.086*** -0.048 0.094*** 0.253***
(0.002) (0.331) (0.000) (0.000) (0.144) (0.006) (0.000)
Democracy 0.003 0.002 -0.0008 0.000 0.002 0.009 -0.024**
(0.627) (0.731) (0.831) (0.993) (0.670) (0.152) (0.033)
Regulation  Quality 0.398*** 0.552*** 0.423*** 0.480*** 0.552*** 0.452*** 0.365***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations  252 252 252 252 252 252 252
Specification 2
Constant -0.450*** -0.286*** -0.888*** -0.567*** -0.286*** -0.293** -0.348***
(0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity -0.008** -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007** -0.008 -0.010***
(0.026) (0.125) (0.534) (0.338) (0.024) (0.102) (0.000)
Population growth 0.143*** 0.091** 0.095* 0.072** 0.091*** 0.170*** 0.251***
(0.000) (0.017) (0.050) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Democracy -0.002 -0.002 0.007 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.009***
(0.660) (0.728) (0.446) (0.857) (0.674) (0.686) (0.000)
Government Effectiveness 0.685*** 0.731*** 0.513*** 0.613*** 0.731*** 0.737*** 0.699***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 252 252 252 252 252 252 252
Panel B: Middle Income Countries(18)
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant 0.213*** 0.165* -0.076*** 0.088** 0.165** 0.394*** 0.572***
(0.001) (0.055) (0.007) (0.040) (0.041) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity -0.004 -0.005 0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.009* -0.002
(0.355) (0.262) (0.529) (0.645) (0.299) (0.089) (0.539)
Population growth -0.251*** -0.226*** -0.225*** -0.249*** -0.226*** -0.265*** -0.294***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000°
Democracy 0.033*** 0.026*** 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.026*** 0.048*** 0.052***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Regulation  Quality 0.660*** 0.699*** 0.709*** 0.713*** 0.699*** 0.691*** 0.641***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 162 162 162 162 162 162 162
Specification 2
Constant 0.126** 0.205*** -0.063 -0.038 0.205*** 0.328*** 0.564***
(0.027) (0.002) (0.178) (0.507) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity -0.008** -0.007** -0.001 -0.004 -0.007* -0.011*** -0.011***
(0.021) (0.040) (0.714) (0.216) (0.082) (0.033) (0.000)
Population growth -0.140*** -0.209*** -0.252*** -0.166*** -0.209*** -0.149*** -0.169***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Democracy 0.016*** 0.009 0.023*** 0.015*** 0.009 0.017** 0.010**
(0.005) (0.220) (0.000) (0.009) (0.149) (0.030) (0.015)
Government Effectiveness 0.765*** 0.704*** 0.606*** 0.692*** 0.704*** 0.807*** 0.910***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 162 162 162 162 162 162 162
Notes.  Dependent variable is the Control of Corruption index.  *,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower 
quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where  the Control of Corruption is least. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. LAD: Least Absolute Deviation. 
LI: Low Income. MI: Middle Income. 
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4.2  Lower middle income and Upper middle income countries 
Table  3  below  presents  results  for  Lower  Middle  Income(LMI)  and  Upper  Middle 
Income(UMI) countries in OLS, LAD and QR estimates. Whereas Panel A presents results for 
LMI countries, Panel B depicts findings for their  UMI counterparts. OLS estimates provide a 
baseline of mean effects and we compare the estimates of LAD and separate quantiles in the 
conditional  distributions  of  the  endogenous  variable.  In  the  comparative  analysis  smaller 
values(in conditional distributions) of the endogenous  variable denote less CC.
The following could be established with respect to findings in Table 3. (1) For both Panel 
A and Panel B, OLS regressions show that while economic prosperity and population growth 
decrease  CC,  government  quality  dynamics  (democracy,  regulation  quality  and  government 
effectiveness) improve it. (2) Based on QR in both LMI and UMI countries, economic prosperity 
reduces incentives to CC with a greater magnitude at higher quantiles: countries that are already 
taking the corruption fight seriously. (3) Population growth is detrimental to CC, however the 
pattern of the distribution is not definite(wave-like effect across the distribution). (4) Broadly,  
democracy ameliorates CC both in UMI and LMI countries with a greater magnitude at higher 
quantiles:  countries with existing high CC levels. (5) Government effectiveness in either LMI or 
UMI countries improve CC with the magnitude increasing with  the conditional distribution up 
to a certain level(0.50th quantile for LMI countries  and 0.75th for UMI countries) before adopting 
a wave-like distribution(for LMI countries) or decreasing(for UMI countries). (6) The positive 
effect of regulation quality on CC is somewhat antagonistic: while for LMI countries it decreases 
to  the 0.50th quantile  before increasing,  for UMI countries  it  increases  to  the 0.25 th quantile 
before dropping progressively.  (6)The LAD  findings correspond to the 0.50th quantile estimates 
across specifications.
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Table 3: Corruption-Control: Lower middle and Upper middle income countries 
Lower Middle Income Countries(10)
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant 0.285*** 0.207** 0.055 0.098* 0.207*** 0.407*** 0.621***
(0.000) (0.049) (0.539) (0.053) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity -0.006 -0.005 0.000 -0.003 -0.005 -0.012* -0.014***
(0.287) (0.443) (0.982) (0.485) (0.462) (0.063) (0.000)
Population growth -0.273*** -0.265*** -0.262*** -0.244*** -0.265*** -0.274*** -0.263***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Democracy 0.036*** 0.032*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.032*** 0.047*** 0.045***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Regulation  Quality 0.706*** 0.645*** 0.750*** 0.705*** 0.645*** 0.694*** 0.781***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations  90 90 90 90 90 92 90
Specification 2
Constant 0.191*** 0.235*** 0.105 0.056*** 0.235*** 0.316** 0.403***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.199) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity -0.013** -0.011 -0.007 -0.009*** -0.011** -0.015 -0.024***
(0.011) (0.133) (0.365) (0.000) (0.014) (0.198) (0.005)
Population growth -0.221*** -0.257*** -0.334*** -0.231*** -0.257*** -0.239*** -0.182***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002)
Democracy 0.022*** 0.017* 0.003 0.009*** 0.017*** 0.024** 0.036***
(0.000) (0.058) (0.694) (0.000) (0.000) (0.049) (0.000)
Government Effectiveness 0.620*** 0.628*** 0.544*** 0.564*** 0.628*** 0.580*** 0.589***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
Upper Middle Income Countries(8)
OLS LAD Q 0.1 Q 0.25 Q 0.50 Q 0.75 Q 0.90
Specification 1
Constant -0.082 -0.301 -0.227** -0.204 -0.301 -0.211* -0.156
(0.930) (0.468) (0.015) (0.207) (0.456) (0.063) (0.725)
Economic Prosperity -0.005 -0.011 0.0007 0.000 -0.011 -0.022*** -0.000
(0.452) (0.399) (0.759) (0.989) (0.268) (0.000) (0.944)
Population growth -0.104 0.019 -0.203*** -0.168** 0.019 -0.010 -0.063
(0.349) (0.924) (0.000) (0.019) (0.914) (0.823) (0.743)
Democracy 0.046* 0.048 0.038*** 0.036** 0.048 0.091*** 0.126***
(0.057) (0.217) (0.000) (0.019) (0.213) (0.000) (0.003)
Regulation  Quality 0.656*** 0.680*** 0.637*** 0.700*** 0.680*** 0.402*** 0.399**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.045)
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72 72
Specification 2
Constant 0.042 0.124 -0.122 -0.022 0.124 0.204* 0.333***
(0.813) (0.595) (0.687) (0.884) (0.430) (0.096) (0.000)
Economic Prosperity -0.006 -0.008 -0.0005 -0.005 -0.008* -0.004 -0.008***
(0.172) (0.131) (0.945) (0.204) (0.052) (0.203) (0.000)
Population growth 0.096 0.111 -0.177 0.013 0.111 0.132** 0.080***
(0.241) (0.289) (0.208) (0.845) (0.126) (0.021) (0.004)
Democracy -0.032 -0.055* 0.014 -0.025 -0.055*** -0.043*** -0.030***
(0.106) (0.084) (0.662) (0.146) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Government Effectiveness 1.159*** 1.232*** 0.720*** 1.026*** 1.232*** 1.279*** 1.210***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72 72
Notes.  Dependent variable is the Control of  Corruption index.  *,**,***, denote significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower 
quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where  the Control of Corruption is least. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. LAD: Least Absolute Deviation. 
LMI: Lower Middle Income. UMI: Upper Middle Income. 
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4.3  Discussion, policy implications and limitations
4.3.1  What do wealth  effects tell us?  
Two important factors that will play in Africa’s future are population growth and good-
governance.  Accelerating demographic change remains  an important  concern in Africa today 
with  the  continent’s  emergence  as  one  with  the  highest  demographic  growth  rate,  with  the 
population projected to double by 2036 and represent 20% of the World by 2050(Asongu & 
Jingwa, 2011). The recent geopolitical landscape of the African continent, marked by the Arab-
Spring has centered around the perils of authoritarian regimes(Asongu, 2012). Thus population 
growth,  democratization  and the  fight  against  corruption constitute  serious  challenges  to  the 
continent’s ability to emerge from poverty. 
Our investigation on the incidence of wealth-effects in the fight against corruption when 
existing corruption-control levels matter has yielded the following broad findings.  (1) Based on 
OLS and QR estimates, population growth is a tool for the fight against corruption only in Low 
income countries  with  a  higher  magnitude  at  higher  quantiles.  This  suggests  that  very poor 
countries  experiencing faster  population  growth rates  could use this  instrument  positively in 
improving  good-governance.   More  so,   LICs  already  taking  the  fight  against  corruption 
seriously  will  benefit  more  from this  tool  than  their  counterparts  still  lax  in  combating  the 
scourge. (2) Population growth in MICs significantly mitigates the fight against corruption; this 
is consistent with UMI as well as LMI countries. This implies, in wealthier African countries 
population growth is accompanied with an increase in ‘bribe-taker bribe-giver interactions’ as 
well a decrease in corruption oversight. (3) Democracy decreases CC in LICs, with a significant 
effect  at  the highest quantile.  In substance,  it  implies democratization in LICs doesn’t  come 
along with institutions  that  effectively combat  corruption.  This  may in  part  be  the result  of 
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relative lack of financial means to set-up appropriate institutions. (4) Democratization is a tool in 
the  fight  against  corruption  only  in  MICs,  with  significant  effects  across  specifications  and 
distributions  for  the  most  part.  This  confirms  the  thesis  that  democracy  requires  a  certain 
threshold in national  economic prosperity for effectiveness. 
4.3.2 Further discussion and  limitations 
  
The battle against corruption remains an important priority in policy making bodies in the 
African continent. Our findings suggest that OLS estimates correspond(stricto sensu) at times to 
just a specific quantile of the conditional distribution. This difference implies that some policies 
based on OLS should be reconsidered, especially across the best and worst fighters of corruption. 
Thus our findings  demonstrate that blanket CC policies are unlikely to succeed equally across 
countries  with   different  income-levels  and   political-wills  in  the  fight  against  corruption. 
Success of CC policies should be contingent on the prevailing levels of CC and income-bracket 
as we have elucidated above. To be effective, CC initiatives should be tailored differently across 
the   best  and worst   corruption-fighting  countries  especially  with respect  to  democracy and 
population growth.
A great many African countries already have well established   CC policies, yet their 
implementation and enforcement is another issue and remains a matter of ‘political will’. The 
following  are  some  aspects  that  need  to  be  accounted  for  if  reform  and  policies  we  have 
proposed are to yield fruits. (1) The battle against corruption cannot be a ‘one man show’ and 
relegated  uniquely to political  leadership.  Anti-corruption endeavors are  effective if  they are 
inclusive,  systematic  and  structured;  that  is  to  say  integrating  all  institutions  and 
policies(investigation, prosecution research and prevention). Such institutionalization develops a 
forum of mutually reinforcing ‘horizontal  accountability’  which prevents reforms from being 
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perceived  as  partisan  concerns  or  ‘witch  hunts’.  (2)  Administrations  could  establish  public 
confidence through regular updates  in press conferences that outline strides that are being made 
towards  mitigating  wrongdoing,  increasing  accountability  and  transparency.  (3)  The 
independence of the anti-corruption body set-up by the powers that be is also paramount for the 
success of reform strategies. In Hong-Kong and Singapore for instance, the effectiveness and 
success of anti-corruption establishments are directly linked to their degree of autonomy. If the 
independent entities are answerable to parliament instead of the head of state, this could improve 
their effectiveness. 
An important limitation to take into account is that studies of this kind depend quite a lot 
on the integrity of the proxy for CC obtained from perception-based measures.  Thus omitted 
variables  and  media-effect  may  significantly  influence  perceptions  on  the  fight  against 
corruption in a given country. However, as far as we know there are no better indicators  of CC 
than those from African Development Indicators of the World Bank.
5.Conclusion 
Why  are  some  nations  more  effective  at  battling  corruption  than  others?  Are  there 
different determinants in the fight against corruption across developing nations? How do wealth 
effects  play-out  when  existing  corruption-control  levels  matter  in  the  corruption  battle?  To 
investigate these concerns we have examined the determinants of corruption-control throughout 
the conditional distribution of the fight against corruption. The following broad findings have 
been established. (1) Based on OLS and QR, population growth is a tool in the fight against  
corruption  only  in  Low  income  countries  with  a  higher  magnitude  at  higher  quantiles.  (2) 
Population  growth  in  Middle  income  countries  significantly  mitigates  the  fight  against 
corruption;  this  is  consistent  with  Upper  as  well  as  Lower  middle  income  countries.  (3) 
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Democracy decreases corruption-control in Low income countries, with a significant effect at the 
highest quantile.  (4) Democratization is a tool in the fight against  corruption only in Middle 
income countries,  with significant  effects  across specifications  and distributions for the most 
part.
As  a  policy  implication, blanket  corruption-control  policies  are  unlikely  to  succeed 
equally across countries with  different income-levels and  political  wills in the fight against 
corruption. Thus to be effective, corruption policies should be contingent on the prevailing levels 
of  corruption-control  and  income-bracket  as  we  have  elucidated  above.  It  follows  that 
corruption-control initiatives should be tailored differently across the  best and worst  corruption-
fighting countries especially with respect to democracy and population growth.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations
Dependent Variable Control of Corruption -0.612 0.561 -1.694 1.086 414
Independent Variables 
Economic  Prosperity 4.602 5.254 -31.30 37.99 414
Population Growth 2.262 0.815 -0.143 4.477 414
Democracy 2.903 3.896 -8.000 10.000 414
Regulation Quality -0.651 0.617 -2.394 0.905 414
Government Effectiveness -0.703 0.603 -1.774 0.807 414
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. 
Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis 
CC RQ RL GE V& A PolS Demo GDPg Popg
1.000 0.753 0.867 0.865 0.628 0.648 0.452 -0.043 -0.292 CC
1.000 0.857 0.865 0.751 0.624 0.466 0.109 -0.224 RQ
1.000 0.907 0.700 0.756 0.510 0.063 -0.282 RL
1.000 0.699 0.644 0.483 0.036 -0.396 GE
1.000 0.582 0.750 0.050 -0.100 V& A
1.000 0.492 0.070 -0.194 PolS
1.000 0.073 -0.094 Demo
1.000 0.279 GDPg
1.000 Popg
CC: Control of Corruption. RQ: Regulation Quality. RL: Rule of Law. GE:Government Effectiveness.  V& A: Voice & Accountability. PolS: 
Political Stability. Demo: Democracy. GDPg: GDP Growth. Popg: Population Growth
  
Appendix 3: Variable Definitions
Variables Signs Variable Definitions Source
Control of Corruption CC Control of Corruption(estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Government Effectiveness GE Government Effectiveness(estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Political Stability/ No Violence PolS Political Stability/ No Violence (estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Regulation Quality R.Q Regulation Quality (estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Rule of Law R.L Rule of Law(estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Voice and Accountability V & A Voice and Accountability (estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Economic Prosperity GDPg GDP growth rate(annual %) World Bank(WDI)
Population growth Popg Average annual population growth rate World Bank(WDI)
Democracy Demo Level of Institutionalized Democracy World Bank(WDI)
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators. 
21
Appendix 4: Presentation of Countries
Instruments Instrument Category Countries Num.
Legal-origins 
English Common-Law Botswana,  The  Gambia,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Lesotho,  Liberia, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland,  Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe.
17
French Civil-Law  Algeria,  Angola,  Benin,  Burkina  Faso,  Burundi,  Cameroon, 
Central  African  Republic,  Chad,  Congo  Republic,  Congo 
Democratic  Republic,  Djibouti,  Egypt,  Eritrea,  Equatorial 
Guinea,  Ivory Coast,  Ethiopia,  Gabon, Guinea,  Guinea-Bissau, 
Libya,  Madagascar,  Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia.
29
Religions Christianity 
Angola, Benin ,Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Congo Republic, Congo  Democratic Republic, Ivory 
Coast,  Equatorial  Guinea,  Ethiopia,  Eritrea,  Gabon,  Ghana, 
Kenya,  Lesotho,  Liberia,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe.
30
Islam Algeria,  Burkina  Faso,  Chad,  Djibouti,  The  Gambia,  Egypt, 
Guinea-Bissau,  Guinea,  Libya,   Mali,  Mauritania,  Morocco, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tunisia.
16
Income Levels
Low Income Benin ,Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo  Republic,  Congo   Democratic  Republic,  Djibouti, 
Ethiopia,  Eritrea,  The Gambia,  Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, 
Kenya,  Liberia,  Madagascar,  Malawi,   Mali,  Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Rwanda,   Sierra Leone,  Togo,  Uganda,  Zambia, 
Tanzania, Zimbabwe.
28
Middle Income Algeria,  Angola  ,Botswana,  Cameroon,  Egypt,  Ivory  Coast, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, Libya,  Mauritius, Morocco, 
Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia.
18
Lower Middle Income Angola,  Cameroon,  Egypt,  Ivory  Coast,  Lesotho,  Morocco, 
Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia.
10
Upper Middle Income Algeria, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya,  Mauritius, 
Namibia, South Africa. 
8
Num: number of countries 
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